[mooxe]

Was CAS very widespread in WW2? There were tons of airstrikes I know that. Were many actually called in by ground troops? There is an excellent system in Irag/Afghan where you can have CAS in just a few minutes or more. With comms not being as widespread throughout vehicles and men, and the fact there was more chaos to deal with back in WW2, I would assume CAS was not widely used. Airpower was probably doing more roaming and hunting then direct support of the troops.

[Dima]

There was, especially with the German army.
Reaction time was much slower though, about 30-45mins.

[ronson]

It wasn't properly used by the British/Commonwealth forces until the reorganisation of the Desert Air force in mid 1942, after that time the practice of attaching Forward Air Controllers to forward army units was taken up, this was futher improved by the 'cab rank' which saw fighter-bomber formations over the battlefield awaiting the call onto tactical targets by these officers.
This system was also adopted in the Italian and NW Europe campaign, so that fighter-bombers could quickly strike at targets on the battlefield.
The main drawback of this sytem was that only the Forward Air Controller could communicate directly with the aircraft, this had grave effects during the first day of Goodwood for example, when the Shermans which carried this team became one of the first to go out of action.
However maybe the limitations of the military net of that time made this the only option, plus of course one couldn't have everyone having the authority to determine targets otherwise total chaos would be the end result.

Cheers
Ronson

[Dima]

Correct me if im wrong, but I believe that effeciency of the german CAS system based on dive bombers was much closer to the modern one in terms of efficiency than US/UK system basing on fighter-bombers with their very limited effeciency against entrenched ground targets.

[vonB]

Air power was a crucial component of the German Blitzkreig.  It went hand in hand with the armoured thrusts and the infantry mop up.  The tanks would exploit the weak areas and carve through them, effectively creating pockets of enemy forces, which the Luftwaffe then pounded the crap out of while the infantry closed in to finish them off.  I have no idea if the Air Support was 'co-ordinated' by troops on the ground, and if so, to what extent.

As to how widespread it was generally, I think probably less than some might imagine, though much more significant from D-Day onwards on the Western Front where it effectively neutered the German motorised manouevering.

So my guess is that overall, CAS was much less significant than it is today, and was sporadic generally.

Nowadays, it is fundemental.  No Commander in their right mind would contemplate any operation (unless covert) without it.  I'd go as far as to say that Air Superiority can guarantee success, unless engaged in guerilla type operations.

[kawasaky]

[kawasaky]

take a look at this, there's a bit of good info:
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=1830&CISOBOX=1&REC=1

[US_Brake]

A decent documentary on this subject is The Military Channels' GUN CAMERA.

CCIV onward seemed to do a good job of introducing Air Power as en element of battle, not overpowered but can still turn the tide in a ciritical moment.

I always liked the RR & WF Jabbos Plug-Ins for CCIII. Would it be easy to convert them to COI?

[Blackstump]

Good article on how they did it in the Pacific...
RAF.[31]

[edit] Pacific and South Asia[edit] South Pacific
A RAAF ground control party during the Battle of Tarakan in 1945Main article: South West Pacific Theater of World War II
In November, 1942 units of the Australian and United States Armies were fighting the Japanese in the Battle of Buna-Gona, New Guinea. 4 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force was an army cooperation squadron flying support for the ground effort, in outdated two-seater CAC Wirraway trainers. They sometimes used the second seat to carry an observer. The local terrain was jungled; ground troops had difficulty in observing the enemy or in staying linked with one another. Therefore, the Wirraway pilots, with their superior observation, began directing artillery fire onto the Japanese from the air via radio, as well as carrying out their own strafing and bombing. One pilot, Pilot Officer J. Archer, even shot down a Japanese Zero, for the only known aerial victory by an Australian FAC.

In early 1943 the Japanese launched an offensive against Wau. On 3 February 1943, a 4 Squadron Wirraway recced (performed Reconnaissance mission) Japanese dispositions at 1:20 PM. It left, to return at 2:39 leading the Bristol Beaufighters of 30 Squadron RAAF into the target area. The Wirraway marked the target with tracer fire, and the Beaufighters struck. A Japanese prisoner captured shortly thereafter reported that out of the 60 troops in his vicinity, 40 had been killed by the air strike. Later, in December, 1944, 4 Squadron directed the US 7th Fighter Squadron as they supported an Australian army attack in the Battle of Shaggy Ridge.

The other cooperation squadron in the theater, 5 Squadron, also took up the forward air control role. Both squadrons were re-equipped with the CAC Boomerang, which was an Australian fighter-bomber containing many Wirraway components. The Boomerangs had performance comparable to enemy fighters, and became the original fast FACs.[32] Dissatisfaction with the poor target marking possible with tracer bullets led to 5 Squadron's use of 30 pound phosphorus bombs on Bougainville in 1944. During the Bougainville campaign, FACs from 5 Squadron directed as many as 20 Corsairs at a time in air strikes. With practice, ordnance came to be delivered as close as 150 yards from friendly troops.[32]

[edit] Aleutian Islands CampaignMain articles: Aleutian Islands Campaign and Battle of Attu
American aerial attackers had to contend with fog and low-lying cloud cover, as well as heavy Japanese defensive ground fire. The situation led to the use of forward air control. On 16 May 1943, General Eugene M. Landrum ordered his air chief of staff, Colonel William O. Eareckson to coordinate air strikes with ground operations for the invasion of Attu. Eareckson borrowed an OS2U Kingfisher from the USS Casco (AVP-12). Using the seaplane's low speed and maneuverability to his advantage, Eareckson flew reconnaissance missions to spot Japanese positions. He would then spiral up through the clouds to rendezvous with strike aircraft and either lead the strike into the targets or describe the target location to the fighter-bombers. Ground fire not only hit the Kingfisher; it sometimes punctured the plane's single float. Eareckson would land in shallow water, beach the plane, and plug the bullet holes with rubber plugs before resuming his mission.[33]

[edit] BurmaBy May 1944 the Air Forces in Burma had worked out the technique of forward air control. This was exercised by a party of one or two officers plus six to eight enlisted men. They approved targets selected by the Army, called up air strikes by radio, and if necessary guided the aircraft to the target. On occasion, liaison aircraft would observe the strike.[34] For the Chindit's Operation Thursday each column had a forward air controller to direct support from Mitchell and Mustang aircraft.[35][36]

[LtReel]

In 1944 at Tali-Ihantala and Vuosalmi battlefields air support was used "orchestrated" with heavy artillery fire. Both FiAF and Detachment Kuhlmey were used to attack advancing tanks, bridges, tarnsports etc. Area commander of FiAF, Col Richard Lorentz, and Kurt Kuhlmey got along well and co-operation had no friction. Lorentz had good relations with Radio Intelligence wizard Col Reino Hallamaa and he had first hand information on enemy movements. When support request came, Lorentz already had a plan for the need.

[dj]

[LtReel]

Ah, digitalized archives are wonderful! I found a post in which there are links to Det. Kuhlmey's support requests in Karelia 1944:

Det. Kuhlmey's mission orders

Reel

[Dima]