[crewman]

Something different in LSA from previous versions is how suppression affects accuracy.

here is a quote from Steve (at Matrix) explaining the difference:

"Prior to LSA, base accuracy was generally quite high and almost every shot any soldier took was a hit of some sort. This was compensated for by jacking up the terrain protection values so that the terrain would protect the target from most hits unless the accuracy of the hit was high (what is called 'critical' or 'good' in the notes above).

The main change in LSA (and on into future versions) is that aiming is now the main factor in accuracy. Troops that are suppressed (or worse) will tend not to aim (or lose their aim if they come under fire) resulting in low chance to hit beyond point blank range. This means that shots actually miss now, and terrain protection values can be dialed back to realistic levels since it no longer has to compensate for unrealistic accuracy ratings."


And another of Steve's quotes: "The chance to hit is lower in LSA and subsequent titles since aiming and soldier skill are more important factors than the inherent weapon accuracy from weapons.txt."

Steve"


So, in LSA ... when a unit becomes suppressed, its accuracy is reduced.

For LSA GJS 7.3 ... some changes were made to increase possibilities of first shot hits for Vehicle Guns and ATG's, since LSA original data, in my opinion, seemed unrealistically inaccurate.

Although first shot "knock out" hits are rare, they are possible.
If a first shot hit doesn't knock out the opposing unit, it's still important to get the first hit during vehicle vs. vehicle and vehicle vs. ATG battles because the crew being hit will be suppressed and their return fire will be less accurate.
This type of suppression makes for some really interesting battles.

Of course suppression also affects infantry in similar ways and cover also plays an important role in combat effectiveness.

[crewman]

And something specific to GJS after version 6.0 ... and part of version 7.3

As mentioned in Steve's quote, soldier skill is an important factor of weapons' accuracy. Units can be assigned different levels of Experience and Morale in the teams files, and the Experience setting contributes to part of the accuracy equation.

Accuracy of weapons fire is part of combat effectiveness ... and in my opinion is determined by many human factors that vary among different people and different groups of people and can be affected by numerous internal and external variables. For example: a more experienced soldier doesn't always equate to being the best soldier ... perhaps battle fatigue, loss of interest, or self preservation have undermined his/her combat effectiveness. Amount of frontline action, weather, clothing, health, sleep, worldview, etc. can also be factors.  

Therefore, in version 7.3 ... similar unit types (for both Allies and Germans) now have the same Experience and Morale levels ... except for obvious lower quality units, like Green and Ost.
When a Sherman fights a Panther, they both use the same accuracy calculation and have similar morale.

The imbalance of accuracy among opposing units is now equalized ... and battle results are determined by the types of weapons available, selection of Active Roster units, how the terrain is used for advantage, ability to gain fire superiority, tactical skill of the player and his/her ability to cope under pressure.
You can't blame the game anymore ... it's your abilities and how you use what you have, that determine battlefield results
And of course the CC probability equation ... you might have a perfect shot, but it may be calculated as a 70% hit. So in that specific case, three out of ten times it's gonna miss

[crewman]

Steve posted this a couple of days ago over at the Matrix forums:

"After some digging in the code, the way 'aiming' works in LSA is quite simple: If a soldier doesn't aim at all, their hit chance is minimal when firing at anything beyond point blank range. Unaimed shots at point blank range have 1/2 accuracy. Everyone always aims unless they're prevented by suppression (suppressed, pinned, or cowered) or morale state (panicked.)

Steve"

[crewman]

more info from Steve:

"- a soldier either aims or he does not. Suppression effects whether a soldier aims at all -- if they're suppressed there is a chance they won't take time to aim. If they're pinned there is a high chance they won't take time to aim.

Any soldier will aim unless they're in a position where they can't (firing blind) or are too rattled to risk it (suppressed or worse.)

The accuracy calculation starts with the weapon's accuracy, as given in weapons.txt, scaled for range.

This initial accuracy is reduced by any wounds or suppression the soldier is under, and increased if he's gone heroic or better.

The resulting accuracy is then reduced a percentage amount corresponding to the max possible experience rating minus the shooter's experience trait (or in the case of crewed weapons/vehicles the higher of the shooter or the spotter's experience trait.) So the lower the experience value, the higher the percentage reduction.

For weapons that get a subsequent shot bonus (any crewed or vehicle weapon) an experienced-level based bonus is then added back to the accuracy value for every shot fired after the first, up to the maximum possible accuracy.

The maximum possible accuracy for any shot is the weapon's accuracy using the given ammo and range, from weapons.txt. For the first shot at new target, the max possible accuracy is the weapon accuracy or the shooter's (or spotter's) experience rating, whichever is lower.

Note that this is only the attacker's accuracy calculation. The actual shot is resolved by the defender and the attacker making an opposed roll where the defender's cover, movement speed, etc. influence the final determination of hit/miss, and the quality of the hit.

That is about as accurate as I can be without spend an hour or two stepping through the code to make sure I have every calculation down. But it does give you the important points -- weapon accuracy and soldier experience are the main modifiers.

Steve"

[Schmal_Turm]

In light of what you say crewman I found the following particularly interesting on the psychology of the fighting man which may help to understand how the average infantry unit works:

The nearness of authority is especially relevant to the real-life obedience requirements of combat and war. As it turns out, individual conscience draws a surprisingly firm line at killing—surprising for those who think of human beings as natural war makers. This aspect of conscience is so resilient in normal people that military psychologists have needed to devise ways around it. For example, military experts now know that to make men kill with any kind of reliability, commands must be given by authorities who are present with the troops. Otherwise, the men in the field will tend to "cheat" on their orders to kill, will intentionally miss-aim or simply fail to fire, to keep from violating this mightiest proscription of conscience.

Brig. Gen. S. L. A Marshall was a United States combat historian in the Pacific theater during World War II and later became the official historian of the European theater of operations. He wrote of many World War II incidents in which almost all soldiers obeyed and fired their weapons while their leaders were present to command them, but when the leaders left, the firing rate dropped immediately to between 15 and 20 percent. Marshall believed that the great relief displayed by soldiers in a sector where they were not being directly ordered to fire "was due not so much to the realization that things were safer there as to the blessed knowledge that for a time they were not under the compulsion to take life."

In his book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, former U.S. Army Ranger and paratrooper Lt. Col. Dave Grossman reviews Marshall's observations, along with the FBI's studies of non-firing rates among law-enforcement officers in the 1950s and 1960s, and observations of non-firing from a long list of wars, including the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Vietnam War, and the Falklands War. He concludes that "the vast majority of combatants throughout history, at the moment of truth when they could and should kill the enemy, have found themselves to be 'conscientious objectors.' " After weighing the considerable historical evidence that ground soldiers often resist and quietly sabotage opportunities to kill, Grossman comes to a "novel and reassuring conclusion about the nature of man: despite an unbroken tradition of violence and war, man is not by nature a killer." To subvert the bottom line of conscience, to be able to thrust a bayonet or pull a trigger to kill a stranger, normal human beings must be carefully taught, psychologically conditioned, and commanded by authorities on the battlefield. Also, it helps to encourage moral exclusion, to remind the troops that the enemy soldiers are nothing but its, Krauts, slants, gooks. As Peter Watson writes in War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology, "the stupidity of local customs is ridiculed," and "local personalities are presented as evil demigods." (From the book, The Sociopath Next Door, by Martha Stout, PhD)[i]

[crewman]

Thanks Schmal_Turm ... very interesting stuff.

[vobbnobb]

what is this that keeps getting hashed over and over again?

[crewman]

[TWJunky]

[mick_xe5]

[TWJunky]

thank you mick, so that means that LSA is the most modern of the "old CCs". how come the modder community hasnt embraced this game yet?